• CN:11-2187/TH
  • ISSN:0577-6686

机械工程学报 ›› 2023, Vol. 59 ›› Issue (5): 247-258.doi: 10.3901/JME.2023.05.247

• 数字化设计与制造 • 上一篇    下一篇

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基于演化博弈的废旧家电回收商与电商平台协作回收投资机制研究

倪霖, 贾宇楠, 王森, 刘娜娜   

  1. 重庆大学机械与运载工程学院 重庆 400044
  • 收稿日期:2022-06-20 修回日期:2022-11-05 出版日期:2023-03-05 发布日期:2023-04-20
  • 通讯作者: 倪霖(通信作者),男,1971年出生,博士,副教授,硕士生导师。主要研究方向为智能制造,智慧物流与供应链,质量及可靠性。E-mail:nilin71@163.com
  • 作者简介:贾宇楠,男,1998年出生,硕士研究生。主要研究方向为供应链管理。E-mail:1349855380@qq.com;王森,男,1997年出生,硕士研究生。主要研究方向为供应链管理。E-mail:ws-1006@foxmail.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划资助项目(2020YFB1712901)。

Research on Cooperative Recycling Investment Mechanism between Waste Household Appliances Recyclers and E-commerce Platforms Based on Evolutionary Game

NI Lin, JIA Yunan, WANG Sen, LIU Nana   

  1. College of Mechanical and Vehicle Engineering, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044
  • Received:2022-06-20 Revised:2022-11-05 Online:2023-03-05 Published:2023-04-20

摘要: 产品回收是绿色制造体系的重要组成部分,废旧家电回收在其中占有很大份额,在废旧家电回收中,电商平台将专业回收商与回收需求用户连接起来的回收模式已成为一个新的发展方向,双方群体之间不可避免的会出现复杂的利益冲突问题,阻碍回收行业的发展。基于此,研究家电回收商与电商平台双方群体在协作回收业务上的复杂利益分配和投资决策问题,构建演化博弈模型,分析双方群体均“加大投资”的演化稳定均衡状态和演化稳定路径,结合数值分析研究各影响因素对模型演化结果的影响。研究发现:电商平台和回收商双方都选择“加大投资”的理想状态为演化稳定策略的前提下会存在一个次优情况;投资成本与额外回收量之间的函数是一个较为关键的因素,当这一因素呈现出某种特定的函数关系时一定不会出现次优情况;平台为回收商设定合理的佣金率有助于达成合作;相比较于提升回收价格来吸引更多消费者参与回收,提高双方合作时的投资利用率以换取更多的回收量带来的效果更好。

关键词: 电商平台, 协作回收, 投资决策, 演化博弈

Abstract: Product recycling is an important part of green manufacturing system. The recycling of waste household appliances occupies a large component of it. In the recycling of waste household appliances, the recycling mode that e-commerce platform connects professional recyclers with recycling users has become a new development direction. Inevitably, there are complex conflicts of interest between the two groups, which hinder the development of the recycling industry. Based on this, the complex interest distribution and investment decisions of recyclers and e-commerce platforms in collaborative recycling business are studied. An evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the evolutionary stability equilibrium state and evolutionary stability path when both groups “increase investment”. Combined with numerical analysis, the influence of various influencing factors on the evolutionary results of the model is studied. The study show that: the e-commerce platform and recycler both choose the ideal state of “increasing investment” as the premise of ESS evolutionary stability strategy, and there is a sub-optimal situation. The function between investment cost and additional recovery amount is a key factor, when this factor presents a certain functional relationship, there i no suboptimal situation. The platform sets reasonable commission rates for recyclers to facilitate cooperation. It is better to improve the investment utilization rate of cooperation between both parties in exchange for more recycling quantity than to increase the recycling price to attract more consumers to participate in recycling.

Key words: E-commerce platform, collaboration recycling, investment decision, evolutionary game

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